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Modern trade theory emphasizes firm-level productivity differentials to explain the cross-
border activities of non-financial firms. This study tests whether a productivity pecking order 
also determines international banking activities. Using a novel dataset that contains all 
German banks’ international activities, we estimate the ordered probability of a presence 
abroad (extensive margin) and the volume of international assets (intensive margin). 
Methodologically, we enrich the conventional Heckman selection model to account for the 
self-selection of banks into different modes of foreign activities using an ordered probit. Four 
main findings emerge. First, similar to results for non-financial firms, a productivity pecking 
order drives bank internationalization. Second, only a few non-financial firms engage in 
international trade, but many banks hold international assets, and only a few large banks 
engage in foreign direct investment. Third, in addition to productivity, risk factors matter for 
international banking. Fourth, gravity-type variables have an important impact on 
international banking activities. 
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1   Motivation 
Recent advances in international economics provide fairly good information about the 
internationalization patterns of firms. Empirically, larger and more productive firms are more 
likely to export and engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) than are smaller and less 
productive firms (see Helpman et al. 2004; Bernard et al. 2006, 2007; Tomiura 2007; Yeaple 
2009). The explanation for these stylized facts involves the interaction between firm-level 
productivity and the costs of market entry (Melitz 2003; Helpman et al. 2008). Domestic fixed 
costs are lower than the costs of exporting, which are lower than the costs of FDI. Exporting 
also entails higher variable costs. Thus, firms self-select into different modes of entry, 
realizing that the higher the fixed costs of a mode of entry, the higher is the required 
productivity, which results in a “pecking order of productivity.”
1  
Yet we know relatively little about the internationalization of services firms and, in 
particular, banks.
2 Therefore, we investigate whether banks differ: To what extent are the 
internationalization decisions of banks determined by productivity, which factors affect the 
extensive (foreign investment decision) and intensive (volume of activities) margins, and 
which factors affect particular modes of activities? In contrast with prior research (e.g., 
Berger et al. 2003; Ruckman 2004; Buch and Lipponer 2007),
3 we explicitly model bank 
productivity and distinguish among different modes of foreign activities (international assets, 
foreign branches, foreign subsidiaries). In addition, we explicitly distinguish the extensive 
from the intensive margin. 
Our study goes beyond previous evidence in four regards. First, we use a novel and 
comprehensive dataset that provides detailed information about the internationalization 
choices of German banks. The “External Position Report” provided by Deutsche Bundesbank 
contains information about the international assets of German banks, their foreign branches, 
and their foreign subsidiaries, year-by-year and country-by-country. There have been no 
minimum reporting thresholds since 2002. Therefore, we have detailed information about all 
domestic and internationally active banks. We find that, in contrast with non-financial firms, 
 
1 In international finance literature, the term “pecking order” also describes the structure of different types of 
international capital flows (Daude and Fratzscher 2008).  
2 Bonfiglioli (2008) provides country-level evidence that financial integration reflected in liberalization spurs 
total factor productivity in the economy but does not analyze the specific role of banks. 
3 Goldberg (2004) discusses the links between literature on financial and non-financial firms’ FDI, with a focus 
on the impact on developing countries. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) show how differences in the degree of 
internationalization of banks can have implications for the effects of monetary policy.  
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many (small) banks hold international assets. In line with evidence for non-financial firms 
though, few banks have foreign affiliates. 
Second, we model the self-selection of banks according to the different modes of foreign 
activities using an ordered probit. We enrich conventional Heckman (1979) models by 
including hierarchical categories in the selection equation. We also show that selection into 
foreign status has a significant impact on the volume of activities. Most previous studies focus 
on large, internationally active banks only,
4 which means they neglect the selection bias 
inherent in heterogeneous firm (productivity) models. 
Third, we take into account the differences in banks’ production processes compared with 
those of non-financial firms. We estimate bank productivity using an empirical methodology 
often applied to non-financial firms, in the spirit of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and applied 
to banks by Nakane and Weintraub (2005). To estimate total factor productivity, banking 
studies often rely on a dual approach in which they estimate the cost or profit functions 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000) and analyze the impact of changes in technology or factor 
inputs. However, this approach neglects the bias that results from the simultaneity between 
input choices and productivity. With our productivity measures, we find clear evidence for a 
productivity pecking order in international banking. Productivity is especially important for 
smaller banks, such as savings and cooperative banks.  
Fourth, our empirical approach is motivated by a stylized model of an international bank. 
As in international trade literature, choosing the optimal mode of foreign activities involves a 
trade-off between fixed and variable costs. In contrast with international trade though, banks 
also take the portfolio effects of their international activities into account. The model yields 
testable implications for bank- and country-level factors that can determine the intensive and 
the extensive margin. Our empirical results support the importance of risk factors for 
internationalization strategies of banks. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we offer some 
background. Section 3 contains our data and descriptive statistics, our empirical model, and 
our measure of bank productivity. After we provide the estimation results in Section 4, we 
conclude in Section 5.  
 
4  See Berger et al. (2003), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005), or Cerruti et al. (2007).  
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2  Theoretical Framework 
To recognize how bank-level and host-country factors may influence international banking, 
consider a simple portfolio model of an international bank. We enrich a baseline closed-
economy portfolio model (Freixas and Rochet 1998) by modeling banks’ choice to service 
foreign markets. Banks can hold international assets through either their domestic 
headquarters (Mode 1) or foreign affiliates (Mode 2).
5 In addition, we assume that banks 
invest but do not borrow abroad.
6 In each period, the bank chooses its optimal portfolio 
structure, and the balance sheet restriction for bank i is given by: 
 (1)  ,   i j i i i i R L L D W    
*
,
where   = initial wealth,   = domestic deposits (liabilities),   = domestic loans (assets), 
 = foreign loans (assets) in country j, and   = risk-free assets.  
i W i D i L
*
ij L i R
To analyze the bank’s choices, consider the profits earned from two modes of foreign 
activities. The expected profit of a domestic bank i holding international assets in country j 
depends on the returns on its domestic and international assets minus its variable costs and the 
fixed costs of foreign activities: 
 (2) 
              
   , 1 1






j i i D ij D
i F ij i L ij j L j i i L ij L ij
F D c r
R r L c r L c r
  
      

   
, 
where   = the fixed costs of Mode 1;   = interest rates on (risky) assets and 
liabilities;   = interest rate on the risk-free asset; 
 j F 1
F r
D L r r , .
j   = country-specific information costs that 
lower the return on international assets, with  1 0   j  ; and   = variable costs. The (1) in 
this equation denotes the bank’s profit function under Mode 1. To model the variable costs, 
we use the iceberg transportation costs method known from the trade literature; the fixed and 
variable costs of international operations vary across host countries. We set the fixed costs of 
domestic operations to 0. 
 , ij c
                                                 
5 Our terminology differs from the World Trade Organization classification of foreign modes. In the language of 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), we focus on cross-border supply (Mode 1) and commercial 
presence (Mode 3). In the empirical model, we also allow for the possibility of remaining a purely domestic bank 
and distinguish between foreign branches and subsidiaries. Adding these options does not affect the qualitative 
results of the theoretical model.  
6 Relaxing these assumptions leaves the main qualitative results of the following analysis unaffected. We also 
abstract from exchange rate risk.  
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Both raising deposits and granting loans is costly for banks, and these costs reflect the 
resource inputs connected to handling loan applications, maintaining a branch network, or 
performing payment services. We assume that banks differ with regard to their productivity 
( i  ) and that more productive banks enjoy lower costs:  








Each bank thus is characterized by a specific productivity level, which also transfers to its 
foreign affiliates. The costs of supplying financial services internationally are higher than 
those in the domestic context, such that      i L ij i L ij c c  
*
, ,  , due to the institutional and 
regulatory differences across financial systems and lack of familiarity with the pool of foreign 
borrowers.  
Therefore, the profits of a bank that establishes foreign affiliates (Mode 2) are:  
(4) 
            
    j i i D ij D
i F ij i L ij L j i i L ij L ij
F D c r
R r L c r L c r
2 2











This specification is similar to Equation (2) with two exceptions. First, we assume that the 
fixed costs of operating under Mode 2 are higher than the fixed costs of Mode 1, 
 (see Cerutti et al. 2007). Second, information costs are lower under Mode 2, 
because the bank is operating in a foreign country. Without loss of generality, we set these 
costs to zero for Mode 2. Our specification thus involves a trade-off between the fixed and 
variable costs of foreign activities, similar to that known in trade literature. 
  j j F F 2 1 
Thus far, our model shares several similarities with models of non-financial firms. The 
main difference between banks and non-financial firms is that the former care about the risk 
of their activities, so we follow Rochet (2008) and assume that the bank’s objective function 
increases with expected profits and decreases with risk:
7 







, Π σ , Π E U U
ij ij
ij ij 0 0 2






With the simplifying assumption that deposits carry no risk, the variance of the portfolio can 
be given by  , where   j
* 2 * 2 * 2 2 2 COV 2 ij i j ij i ij L L L L Π σ       
2 * 2
j    is the country-specific risk 
                                                 
7 This specification holds under certain assumptions in an incomplete markets setting; see Rochet (2008).   
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of domestic (foreign) assets, and COVj is the covariance matrix of domestic and foreign 
returns.  
We use this model to analyze the intensive and extensive margins of banks’ foreign 
activities.
8 For the extensive margin, the bank chooses to be active in the foreign country if its 
expected utility is positive, that is, if   holds. Using Equations (3)–(5), it is 
straightforward to show that the probability of investing abroad is higher with (1) lower fixed 
costs of foreign activity ( ), (2) lower information costs (
0  U
j F j  ), (3) higher bank productivity 
( i  ), and (4) lower risk of foreign activities ( ). Moreover, banks prefer Mode 2 over 
Mode 1 if their productivity exceeds a threshold (
2 *
j 
 ) – such that banks with     i  choose 
Mode 1, but banks with     i  choose Mode 2 and maintain affiliates abroad – and if the 
savings in the fixed costs associated with entering through Mode 2 are small relative to the 
higher variable costs under Mode 1. 
The volume of international activities, the intensive margin, can be analyzed by 











, *       i j ij
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By denoting the degree of the bank’s risk aversion,  
















 ,  
we can rewrite the first-order condition from Equation (6) as 
(6’)      . 0 COV
1
1 j










     i j ij
i
i L ij L j j
ij ij













With Equation (6’), we obtain comparative static results that demonstrate which banks will 
increase the volume of their international assets when they experience higher gross returns 
( ), lower information costs (
*
L r j  ), higher productivity and thus lower variable costs 
                                                 
8 We summarize the results of the comparative static analysis in Table 2. 
9 The qualitative results are the same for the different modes; therefore, we drop the indices.  
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 ( ), lower risk ( ), lower correlations between domestic and foreign returns (lower 
), and lower degrees of risk aversion (






i  ).  
In summary, our model shows that bank heterogeneity, with regard to productivity and risk 
aversion, influences internationalization patterns. It also shows some differences and 
similarities between banks and non-financial firms. For both types of firms, foreign entry 
becomes more likely when the fixed costs of foreign activity are lower, the savings associated 
with variable costs are higher, and productivity is higher. The volume of activities also 
increases with productivity and falls with variable costs. However, banks also take the risk–
return trade-off of their foreign activities into account.  
3  Empirical Methodology 
3.1  Data about Patterns of Internationalization
10 
We apply the implications of our proposed model to German bank-level datasets, which were 
kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. We use a detailed database on banks’ 
international assets, the so-called External Position Report, to gain comprehensive 
information about the international assets of domestic banks, their foreign branches, and their 
foreign subsidiaries year-by-year and country-by-country. We study the database for the years 
2002–2006; reporting thresholds for international assets were abolished in January 2002. 
Therefore, we have exact information about the extensive and intensive margin of banks’ 
foreign operations, and we do not face problems associated with truncation or censoring.  
To obtain information about the extensive margin of banks’ foreign operations, we 
manually link branches and subsidiaries located in country j to their domestic parent bank i. 
We obtain information about the intensive margin of banks’ foreign operations by aggregating 
all assets held in country j across the different modes of foreign activity. We use a composite 
foreign asset and do not distinguish between different types of assets to keep the analysis 
tractable. Most of the assets we include are interbank assets. We also complement the 
External Position Report with information from the annual balance sheets and income 
statements of all banks operating in Germany between 2000 and 2006. Each bank that holds a 
German banking license must submit these data to the supervisory authorities.  
                                                 
10 We provide the details in the Data Appendix.  
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Our dataset therefore contains observations for each bank (i = 2,235), each country (j 
= 58), and each year (t = 5). Our data cover both members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries and paints a comprehensive 
picture of German banks’ foreign activities. We distinguish the following modes of operation: 
o  Purely domestic banks without foreign activities (Mode 0), 
o  Banks that hold international assets through their domestic headquarters (Mode 1), 
o  Banks that maintain foreign branches (Mode 2a), and 
o  Banks that maintain foreign subsidiaries and/or foreign branches (Mode 2b). 
Each bank–year observation may appear in only one of these modes. The ranking of the 
modes follows the presumed fixed costs involved. Subsidiaries are legally independent, hold 
their own equity, and are subject to host-country control, so they demand the highest costs in 
terms of capital requirements and regulatory burden. In addition, foreign subsidiaries often 
enable large-scale retail operations, which again implies the highest fixed costs, in addition to 
the regulatory start-up costs (Cerutti et al. 2007). 
In Table 1 and Figure 1, we highlight four main characteristics of the internationalization 
patterns of German banks: First, in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 1, we note the structure of the 
full sample, which allows for all possible combinations among banks, countries, and years. 
The allocation of total observations across modes of internationalization is highly dispersed, 
showing many zero values (almost 80%) in the bilateral matrix. Approximately 20% of 
observations fall in the second category of international assets. The number of observations in 
Modes 2a and 2b (affiliates) is tiny, accounting for less than 1% of the total. This high degree 
of dispersion reflects our decision to allow for all possible combinations among banks, 
countries, and years.  
Second, the data clearly are inflated, because we treat each bank in each country as a 
separate observation. Determining whether a particular bank is active abroad produces quite a 
different picture (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). On average, only 28 of a total of 2,235 banks 
are purely domestic, 27 maintain foreign branches, and 37 use subsidiaries and/or branches. 
The largest group by far consists of banks that hold international assets in at least one foreign 
country (2,143). Therefore, the evidence for banks differs from that for manufacturing firms, 
of which only a small subset of firms imports or exports. 
Third, not even the large banks with international affiliates operate in all countries (see 
Table 1, Column 5). If banks hold international assets, they do so in 21 countries on average.  
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Banks in Mode 2a keep branches in an average of 12 countries; banks in Mode 2b average 
subsidiaries in 9 countries.  
Fourth, considering the volume of international assets, those held through domestic banks 
(Mode 1) and those held through foreign branches (Mode 2a) take roughly similar importance 
(Figure 1). The share of international assets held in foreign subsidiaries (Mode 2b) is small; 
the relative patterns in the data are similar for mean investments. Comparing the mean and 
median investment of banks in each country in each mode reveals a substantial amount of 
heterogeneity across banks. In Mode 1 (international assets), for example, the mean 
investment is €8.6 million, though the median is only €0.14 million.  
In summary, our data paint a nuanced picture of the internationalization of German banks. 
On the one hand, the banking system is highly internationalized, and many banks hold 
international assets in at least one foreign country. On the other hand, only a few banks 
maintain foreign affiliates, and investment volumes are dominated by just a few large players. 
3.2  Modeling Extensive and Intensive Margins 
Our basic empirical setup is a self-selection model, in the spirit of Heckman (1979). We 
replace the conventional selection equation with an ordered probit model to mirror the 
hierarchy of modes of activities. The extensive margin (EM) reflects the discrete decision of 
banks: whether and through which mode to be present in a foreign market. Our model of bank 












where   describes the intensive margin, and  ijt IM IM   is the standard error of the intensive 
margin’s error term. The error terms u and v are assumed to follow a standard bivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero, unit variances, and correlation  .
11 Errors are 
independent from the covariates X and Z. We can identify the extensive and the intensive 
margin when X is a subset of Z (Wooldridge 2002), and we use dummies for different bank 
groups as exclusion restrictions. The covariates capture productivity, other bank-level, and 
host country-specific variables, which we describe subsequently (Section 4.1). Because we 
                                                 
11 This specification allows us to apply a standard normal distribution in the correction term, drawing on 
Winkelmann and Boes (2009).   
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can observe the intensive margin only if  , and because the error terms are 
correlated, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of  would suffer from a selection bias. 
0  ijt EM
We model the extensive margin as an ordered probit model, which yields consistent 
coefficient estimates of  , as well as threshold values  a 2 1,  , and  b 2  , which separate the 
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This exposition underpins the pecking order of the different modes of foreign activity, 
because we must have  b a 2 2 1       for the probabilities to be positive. Checking whether 
the threshold parameters  both indicate an ascending order and differ significantly from one 
another provides a good test for the ordering of the different modes. Furthermore, the 
estimated cut-off values can be interpreted as proxies for the fixed costs of foreign activity 
that banks must cover. 
To estimate the determinants of the intensive margin, we must take the bias induced by the 
selection of banks into the different modes into account. For this purpose, we take the 
conditional expectations of the intensive margin: 
(10)       k EM Z u E
,
  X IM ijt   k EM Z IM E ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt    , ,
where  . Using the assumption about the correlation of errors across the margins, 
we can simplify the conditional expectations of the error term in Equation (10) to  
b a k 2 , 2 , 1 
        ,
12   ijt k ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt Z v Z Z k EM v E           1 , k ijt v E  
which resembles the Mills ratio in a standard Heckman model. We replace the conventional 
selection equation by an ordered probit model, so our corresponding correction term   
depends on the specific mode chosen by bank i. The intensive margin thus transforms into: 
k
ijt 
(10’)   
k
ijt IM ijt ijt ijt ijt X k EM Z IM E        ,
,
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The correction term specified in Equation (10’) performs a function analogous to that of 
the inverse Mills ratio in a conventional sample selection (Heckman 1979). Neglecting this 
term would lead to an omitted variable bias, following from the assumption that u and v in 
Equation (8) are not independent but instead are bivariate normally distributed. Our 
hierarchical modeling of the extensive margin thus contains information that affects the 
estimation of the intensive margin.  
3.3   Measuring Bank Productivity  
The availability of an unbiased measure of bank-level productivity ( it  ) is key to our 
empirical model. Several banking studies measure total factor productivity using a dual 
approach, which implies the estimation of cost or profit functions, then attribute productivity 
changes to factor accumulation, technological change, or changes in efficiency (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell 2000). We use a more direct approach based on a production function. As argued 
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), this method avoids the violation 
of the (often implicit) independence assumption between productivity and the factor input 
choices of banks (see Technical Appendix 7.2). The approach is less common in banking 
literature though (cf. Nakane and Weintraub 2005, for Brazilian banks).  
Considering the ongoing debate about bank production, our choice of banks’ inputs and 
outputs is inevitably heuristic. We follow Nakane and Weintraub (2005) and the theoretical 
contributions by Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008), who suggest a model of bank 
production, rather than the abundant literature pertaining to the specification of multi-product 
cost and profit models. Our decision is motivated by two main considerations. First, to make 
our results comparable to literature investigating non-financial multinational firms (e.g., 
Greenaway et al. 2007), we use a similar measure of productivity. Second, we prefer the 
parsimonious measure of productivity that focuses on the volume of financial services  
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provided. We also include covariates to control for the risk characteristics of banks, captured 
by the CAMEL concept (i.e., capitalization, asset quality, managerial skill, earnings, and 
liquidity). 
We specify the aggregate lending volume of a bank as its output (Nakane and Weintraub 
2005). That is, banks act as intermediaries between savers and investors (Martín-Oliver and 
Salas-Fumás 2008), so the volume of borrowing and lending represents bank output. Our first 
input variable is the sum of deposits and other debt liabilities. The second input is bank staff. 
In addition to human capital, banks must have physical facilities, such as branches and 
offices, as well as IT and back-office infrastructures, to provide loans. Because these variables 
cannot be adjusted quickly, we include fixed assets as a state variable.  
To obtain unbiased measures of bank productivity, we also must specify intermediate 
inputs that perform two functions. First, they must be informative regarding productivity, and 
second, they must influence output through their impacts on factor accumulation, which is a 
more subtle choice for banks than for non-financial firms. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
suggest specifying intermediate inputs, such as materials or electricity subtracted from gross 
value added, that contribute to the production process and depend on productivity. In our 
banking application, equity capital can fulfill the key requirements of such an intermediate 
input. That is, equity rarely is used to fund loans (Mester 1997), but it indicates a bank’s risk-
taking to markets and regulators (Berger 1995) and thus determines funding costs and 
demand. Because determining optimal levels of (costly) equity capital under regulatory 
constraints is a key task of bankers, it should correlate with bank productivity.  
In Table 3a, we summarize descriptive statistics for the variables we use to estimate bank 
productivity; in Table 3b, we report the parameter estimates for the production functions. 
These estimates are fairly similar to those reported by Nakane and Weintraub (2005) for 
Brazilian banks. We reject constant returns to scale ( 1 3 2 1       ). Our productivity 
estimates instead indicate slightly decreasing returns to scale, in line with indirect evidence 
from dual approaches used to estimate scale cost economies in German banking. For 
comparison, we also report results from basic OLS regressions, which highlight the severe 
bias in parameters when we neglect the simultaneity of production choices and bank 
productivity. The OLS intercept can be interpreted as a Solow productivity residual. Because 
the estimate of productivity ( i  ) is bank-specific, the left-hand panel in Table 3b lacks this 
entry. We also do not report the parameter estimate of the intermediate input (equity) in the  
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Levinsohn-Petrin specification, because equity is an ancillary parameter, required only to 
obtain unbiased estimates of productivity.  
We report bank productivity and bank-level covariates for the different modes of 
internationalization in Table 4. With regard to the CAMEL variables, the patterns in the data 
are quite clear: More complex and more costly modes of international operations are 
associated with a lower degree of capitalization, lower reserve holdings, lower loan-loss 
provisions, lower cost-to-income ratios, lower return on equity, and lower liquidity. These 
findings match the hypothesis that indicates more productive banks are more likely to be 
active internationally and function in more complex modes; they also are consistent with a 
productivity pecking order. In addition, banks with a lower revealed degree of risk aversion 
are more active internationally.  
4  Data and Empirical Results 
4.1  Explanatory Variables 
The internationalization decision of banks should, according to our theoretical model, depend 
on various bank-level and country-level parameters, which we specify next.
13  
4.1.1. Bank-level variables 
Our main measure of bank productivity derives from the production function approach 
described in Section 3.3. We expect a positive impact. To account for other aspects of bank 
productivity, we include the cost-to-income ratio (we expect a negative sign), a bank’s return 
on equity (expected positive sign), and an indicator variable to indicate the quintile of the size 
distribution of the bank’s assets (from 1 to 5, expected positive sign) (for a similar 
specification, see Greenaway et al. 2007). 
A bank’s degree of risk aversion cannot be observed directly, but the CAMEL profile 
contains four indirect measures of bank risk. Specifically, banks with a low degree of 
capitalization, low hidden reserves, high non-performing loans, and low loan-loss provisions 
should have higher levels of risk and, ceteris paribus, a low degree of risk aversion.  
Dummy variables also capture heterogeneity across banks in terms of the different banking 
groups and locations. A (0, 1) dummy for banks located in the former East Germany accounts 
                                                 
13 See also the Data Appendix and Table 2 for a summary of the expected signs. All variables except the dummy 
variables and those expressed in percentages are in logs.   
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for the lower degree of international integration of this region compared with the German 
average. In the selection equation, we also include banking group dummies to distinguish 
large banks, commercial banks, and savings banks from cooperative banks, as the omitted 
category.  
4.1.2. Country-level variables 
Larger and more developed markets should make those countries more attractive 
destinations for international banks, so we expect a positive sign for market size and gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. International banking relates closely to the international 
activities of non-financial firms, so we also include total German FDI as a proxy for real 
integration and the demand for financial services by German firms abroad, which we 
anticipate will have a positive impact. We provide the descriptive statistics in Table 5. 
In international finance literature, geographical distance between two countries has 
become the standard proxy for information costs (e.g., Portes and Rey 2005; Aviat and 
Coeurdacier 2007; Daude and Fratzscher 2008). Providing financial services to more distant 
markets or setting up distant foreign affiliates should be more costly than doing business in 
nearby markets, so we expect a negative sign for distance. As an additional proxy of 
information costs, we specify a composite index for the level of institutional quality (see also 
Beck et al. 2006) that comprises six dimensions of indices constructed by Kaufman et al. 
(1999). A higher value indicates better institutional quality; we expect a positive sign. 
International trade (or banking) literature using bilateral data often includes additional 
dummies, such as the presence of a common border or a common language. We do not 
include such variables, because we use information for only one source: country of 
international assets. Language or border dummies would be highly collinear with country 
fixed effects or geographic distance.  
For the portfolio effects, we proxy for macroeconomic, country-specific risks using the 
standard deviation of GDP growth (growth volatility) in each host country j, computed over 
the past five years.
14 We expect a negative sign. To measure the correlation between domestic 
and foreign returns, we use the growth correlation of German and foreign GDP growth rates 
for rolling windows of five-year periods and again expect a negative sign, because higher 
                                                 
14 We compute growth volatility and growth correlations on the basis of residual GDP growth, regressed on a full 
set of time-fixed effects, to account for general macroeconomic developments that may influence GDP growth.  
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correlations imply less potential for diversification. A dummy for countries in the Euro area 
provides a proxy of the (absence of) exchange rate risk. 
Fixed costs of foreign activity: Our first proxy for the fixed costs of foreign activities are 
activity restrictions faced by banks. This is a discrete measure which indicates restrictions on 
services and products that banks are allowed to offer, and restrictions on non-financial firm 
ownership and control (Beck et al. 2006). The expected sign is negative because tighter 
activity restrictions deter foreign activity. A similar reasoning applies to more stringent 
capital restrictions, which is the sum of initial and overall capital stringency requirements per 
country.  
Finally, for controls, we include the concentration of the host banking market, though we 
cannot predict the sign direction a priori. On the one hand, higher concentration could 
stimulate entry if it indicates higher returns; on the other hand, higher concentration could 
indicate the presence of implicit barriers to entry. We also feature three dummy variables to 
indicate whether a country is an offshore destination, is a developing country according to the 
income taxonomy of the Worldbank, or hosts a financial center. 
4.2  Baseline Regression Results 
We present the baseline results in Table 6, using four different specifications of the extensive 
and the intensive margin: (1) a baseline model only including bank productivity, (2) the 
baseline model plus individual bank-level covariates, (3) the baseline model plus bank- and 
country-level covariates (excluding regulations), and (4) the baseline model plus bank- and all 
country-level covariates (including regulations). The F-tests show that all groups of variables 
are jointly significant. We lag all variables by one year to mitigate any reverse causality 
concerns. 
We split the country-level covariates into two subgroups, because regulatory variables are 
not available for all countries. Our preferred specification is the full specification (see 
Columns 4 and 8), which captures the fixed costs of entry. Adding the country-level variables 
significantly increases the explanatory power, especially for the extensive margin (Column 2). 
In the specification that only features productivity, the R² is 0.01 for the extensive margin 
(intensive margin 0.10), but the value increases as we add bank-level covariates and dummies 
(0.13 and 0.21) and the country-level variables (0.40 and 0.29).    
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4.2.1. Is There a Productivity Pecking Order? 
Our results support a productivity pecking order in international banking. First, all cut-offs 
for the extensive margin are significantly different from zero, which indicates a hierarchy of 
internationalization modes. The higher fixed costs of more complex activities abroad appear 
in the higher cut-off values. Simple t-tests show the first-stage cut-offs are significantly 
different from one another. 
Second, the estimated cut-offs increase more in absolute terms when we move from Mode 
1 to Mode 2a compared with the move from Mode 2a to Mode 2b. Considering the interval 
length relative to a particular coefficient, such as that for productivity   od k k Pr 1 /     , we 
note that productivity must increase significantly for a bank to achieve the next category. 
According to our estimates, opening a subsidiary does not require much more productivity, 
because the bank already maintains a branch in a specific country (transition from Mode 2a to 
2b). In contrast, the additionally required productivity is considerable if the bank moves from 
Mode 1 (international assets held domestically) to Modes 2a or 2b: 
   od a b od a Pr 2 2 Pr 1 2 / /          .  
Third, the correction term in the outcome equation varies by mode of activity, which 
implies that it captures the hierarchy of cut-offs. Previous studies fail to take this selection 
into a particular mode of internationalization into account; they focus instead on 
internationally active banks only.  
Fourth, productivity has a positive and significant impact on both margins. Paired with the 
significant cut-offs, this finding offers evidence of a productivity pecking order, which is 
robust against the addition of other bank-level variables related to productivity. For example, 
size and return on equity have the expected positive effects; our finding that larger and more 
profitable banks expand abroad generally is in line with prior literature pertaining to 
international banking (Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005; Buch and Lipponer 2007). We also 
demonstrate the joint impact of productivity on both extensive and intensive margins. The 
cost-to-income ratio has a positive effect on the extensive and a negative effect on the 
intensive margin. Whereas the latter negative effect is in line with our expectations, the 
positive impact for the extensive margin may reflect competitive pressures in the bank’s home 
market, which would increase its probability of investing abroad.   
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4.2.2. Impact of Risk Aversion 
The productivity pecking order suggests some similarities between banks and non-financial 
firms. But an important difference remains: Banks take the risk of their foreign activities 
explicitly into account. Our results confirm that the degree of risk aversion – which we 
measure on the basis of high capitalization, high reserves, high loan-loss provisions, and low 
non-performing loans – is important. With this interpretation, we find that banks that are 
willing to take on higher risks are more likely to be active internationally; the signs for 
capitalization and reserves are negative and significant for the extensive margin. Signs for 
loan-loss provisions and non-performing loans may be consistent with this interpretation, but 
these variables are not significant in our (preferred) full specification. 
The picture changes for the intensive margin, for which the positive signs for capitalization 
and loan-loss provisions and the negative sign for non-performing loans suggest less risk-
averse (more stable) banks do more business. This result may suggest a demand-side effect. 
Our dependent variable is a composite asset dominated by interbank activities, and in 
interbank markets, trust in the stability of market participants represents an important 
determinant of lending relationships.
15  
Overall, our results indicate that the decision to venture abroad is positively affected by a 
low degree of risk aversion. Once abroad, less risky banks generate higher business volumes.  
4.2.3. Additional Bank-Level Variables 
The dummy variables for the banking groups are significant. Large, commercial banks are 
more likely to extend abroad than are cooperative banks (omitted category); savings banks are 
less likely to do so. Banks headquartered in the former East Germany are significantly less 
active in international markets. Given that the East German banks have invested abroad 
though, their volume of activity is above average.
16 
4.2.4. Market Size 
We consistently find a positive impact of market size on the extensive margin, in that 
GDP, GDP per capita, and total German FDI are positive and significant. The impacts of GDP 
per capita and German FDI are positive and significant on the intensive margin as well. The 
                                                 
15 The negative sign on hidden reserves is not inconsistent; hidden reserves partly reflect peculiar features of the 
German accounting system, which may be difficult to verify for foreign partners. 
16 A possible explanation could be the follow-your customer motive. Since only a few East German banks are 
active internationally, the demand for banking services from home country clients is concentrated on these 
banks.   
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volume of foreign assets correlates negatively with market size (GDP), because we control for 
the volume of FDI. If we drop FDI, we achieve a positive and significant coefficient. In this 
sense, our results confirm studies that indicate a link between trade and financial integration 
(e.g., Aviat and Coeurdacier 2007; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2009).  
4.2.5. Information Costs 
Our main measure of information costs, geographic distance, reveals the expected negative 
sign for the extensive margin. When distance increases by 1%, GDP increases by 
approximately 1.7% ( ) for a bank that chooses the same mode of entry. The 
positive coefficient of distance for the intensive margin again appears due to our inclusion of 
FDI as our measure for real integration; if we exclude FDI, distance has a negative impact on 
the intensive margin, too.  
GDP Dist   ˆ / ˆ 
The index of institutional quality is insignificant for the extensive and negative for the 
intensive margin; we expected a positive sign. We only find this positive sign for cooperative 
banks. For these banks with limited international experience, a good information environment 
is more important than it is for the larger banks (see Table 8).  
4.2.6. Macroeconomic Portfolio Effects 
To measure portfolio and risk effects at the country level, we use the volatility of foreign 
GDP growth and the cross-country correlation of GDP growth with Germany (Portes and Rey 
2005). Generally, our results support previous studies that use similar data and empirical 
approaches, in the sense that we find positive impacts of volatility and correlation and thus a 
“correlation puzzle” (e.g., Portes and Rey 2005 in equity markets; Aviat and Coeurdacier 
2007 for banking). Both volatility and correlations should have a negative impact on both 
margins, but we find this effect only for the impact of volatility on the extensive margin.  
Lower exchange rate risk increases German banks’ exposure to Euro area countries. The 
impact on the extensive margin is positive if we do not control for country-level covariates, 
but it is negative in our full specification. German banks have a below-average presence in 
Euro area countries, presumably because those nearby countries can be served from the home 
market. The positive impact of the Euro on cross-border banking (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
2009) might cloud different adjustments along the extensive and intensive margins.   
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4.2.7. Fixed Costs of Foreign Activity 
Tighter activity restrictions and capital regulations have the expected negative impacts on 
the extensive margin, in support of our use of these variables as proxies for fixed costs. The 
impact of regulatory restrictions on the volume of activities is positive though; that is, banks 
that have entered a particular foreign market engage in more activities there. As we show in 
Table 8, this positive effect is driven by the large banks, whereas for other banking groups, 
activity and capital restrictions have a negative impact on the volume of activities. Moreover, 
for these latter banks, the effect of activity restrictions is greater. 
4.2.8. Country-Level Control Variables 
The concentration results confirm our ambiguous theoretical expectations. Higher 
concentration in foreign banking markets increases the probability of foreign activity by 
German banks but lowers the volume. In our baseline specification, we find a negative sign 
for the offshore dummy, and splitting the sample according to banking group shows that this 
effect is driven by cooperative banks (see Table 8). For the large banks, the offshore dummy 
reveals the expected positive sign. The signs for developing countries (negative) and financial 
centers (positive) match our expectations.  
Finally, to put coefficient estimates into perspective, we provide marginal effects in 
Table 7 for the extensive and intensive margins. Because we use an ordered response model 
with discrete outcomes to model the extensive margin, the marginal effects differ across 
modes and indicate the extent of change in the probability of choosing one distinct mode in 
reaction to a change in a particular explanatory variable (at the mean). As we show in Table 7, 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP and distance have key impacts on bank 
internationalization, and they are more important than many of the bank-level variables. In 
this sense, our results confirm previous literature for non-financial firms. The marginal effects 
for Mode 2a are insignificant because Modes 2a and 2b are very similar.  
In summary, we find evidence of a productivity pecking order in international banking and 
an impact of bank-level risk on internationalization. Banks with less risk aversion appear 
more internationally oriented, though their volume of activity is lower, ceteris paribus. In 
addition, banks’ foreign activities increase with market size, low information costs, and low 
entry barriers. The impact of macroeconomic volatility is not clear cut, which is consistent 
with the “correlation puzzle” (Aviat and Coeurdacier 2007) in previous literature.   
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4.3  Robustness Tests 
We perform several robustness tests based on the panel dimensions of our data and estimates 
of the model for different banking groups. These unreported results are available on request. 
The results consistently confirm the pecking order: The estimated cut-offs are significant and 
increase for more complex modes of foreign activity, the interval length relative to the 
productivity coefficient declines for more complex modes of activities, and productivity and 
size have positive and significant impacts. 
We initially ignored the panel dimension of our dataset and pooled all observations across 
years, including time-fixed effects. Estimating the same model by year-by-year gives stable 
results for most variables, though particularly for those that we use to test the pecking order 
hypothesis. We also cluster the standard errors at the bank level, at the country level, and at 
the bank–country level. We bootstrapped the standard errors to consider productivity as a 
generated regressor. The findings are robust to these variations.  
We also use a bank-country fixed effects panel for the intensive margin. The bank-specific 
productivity measure becomes insignificant, because there is relatively little within-sample 
variation in bank productivity, which is picked up by the fixed effects. The results for the size 
measure and the correction term do not change (both are positive and significant). 
We also conduct the test suggested by Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) to account for 
endogenous regressors in the primary equation (our intensive margin equation), as well as 
heterogeneously distributed and serially dependent error terms in the selection and primary 
equation. We adapt their method and estimate the extensive margin year-by-year while adding 
time averages of the bank-level variables. We compute the correction terms separately for 
each year and include them in the intensive margin equation. The productivity, core bank-
level, and macro-level covariates preserve their significance and are qualitatively identical to 
those reported previously. 
An objection to our analysis might note that we pool banks with different 
internationalization traditions. Therefore, we split the sample into the different banking 
groups: large, commercial, savings, and cooperative banks. The results in Table 8 reveal 
similar findings for the country-level covariates; we already have alluded to the differences 
across banking groups.  
Our focus on productivity and risk may ignore that smaller (savings and cooperative) 
banks might not be as active internationally, despite being highly productive, whether because  
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they are legally prevented from operating abroad or because they have access to international 
markets through their head institutions (e.g., the Landesbanken for savings banks). Our results 
confirm this expectation only partly. That is, we find a similar pecking order for small and 
large banks in qualitative terms, but an increase in productivity has a much greater impact on 
both extensive and intensive margins for smaller than for larger banks. The only banking 
group for which productivity has a negative impact are commercial banks, which include 
private banks that often focus on specific segments of the German domestic banking market. 
With regard to the risk results, we recognize that smaller banks might be different because, 
as an example, savings banks fall under public ownership and thus are covered by implicit or 
explicit state guarantees. However, our results do not confirm that the degree of risk aversion 
of publicly owned and privately owned banks exert systematically different impacts on 
internationalization patterns. If anything, more risk-averse, large banks appear more likely to 
enter foreign markets, though they engage in lower volumes of activities. For the remaining 
banking groups, risk features matter, but there is no clear link between the degree of risk 
aversion and the pattern of activities. 
Finally, pooling across countries at different stages of development might affect our 
results. Therefore, we re-estimate the model for OECD countries only; the main results are 
similar, particularly with regard to the bank-level variables and productivity effects. The 
impact of country-level variables, such as market size and regulations, may differ slightly.  
5  Conclusions 
Size, productivity, and internationalization decisions by firms obviously relate. Yet despite a 
vibrant literature focused on explaining the “productivity pecking order” for non-financial 
firms, we know relatively little about such effects for services firms, such as banks. Bridging 
this gap and testing whether banks differ represent the main purposes of this research. 
From a theoretical point of view, we expect determinants of banks’ international activities 
to be similar to those for non-financial firms. Higher fixed costs deter foreign activity, and 
banks face a trade-off between fixed and variable costs across different modes of entry. More 
productive banks should be more likely to invest abroad and hold higher international assets. 
In addition, bank-specific preferences for risk should affect internationalization decisions. 
To analyze the link among productivity, risk, and internationalization patterns empirically, 
we use a novel, bank-level dataset that includes detailed information about the extensive and  
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intensive margins of foreign activity. Our data enable us to distinguish purely domestic banks, 
banks that hold international assets, banks with foreign branches, and banks with foreign 
subsidiaries and branches.  
We model the internationalization decision of banks in a two-step empirical model. In the 
first step, we estimate bank-level productivity by applying Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) 
model to the banking industry. In the second step, we model the extensive and intensive 
margins of foreign activity in the spirit of Heckman, using an ordered probit model for the 
selection equation. Our correction for selection explicitly accounts for the selection into 
different modes. 
Our results then reveal some similarities and differences between the internationalization 
patterns of banks and non-financial firms. Only the largest banks engage in complex modes of 
internationalization and set up foreign affiliates, and also similar to the non-financial sector, 
only a few and large firms engage in FDI. Our findings thus provide robust support for the 
pecking order hypothesis. More complex and more costly modes of internationalization 
require greater productivity, so more productive banks tend to engage more internationally 
than do less productive banks, as well as hold higher international assets. Selection into 
foreign status therefore has a significant impact on the volume of activities. For banks (as for 
non-banks), gravity variables are critically important. Larger distances discourage 
international banking, larger and more developed markets promote international banking, and 
activity restrictions deter banks.  
Yet we also highlight two noteworthy differences between international banking and non-
financial firms. First, risk factors at the bank level affect their foreign activities. More risk-
averse banks are less likely to expand abroad, but they engage in larger volumes of activities. 
Risk factors at the country level also matter, but the signs of these effects do not always 
reflect theoretical expectations, which mirrors the correlation puzzle found in previous 
literature. Second, small, non-financial firms typically are domestically oriented and do not 
trade or engage in FDI, but smaller banks typically hold foreign assets in at least one market. 
This finding suggests the smaller fixed costs of holding international assets compared with 
selling or sourcing abroad. It also indicates that the motive for internationalization differs, and 
portfolio considerations play an important role for banks.  
Our study provides a first step in the exploration of the extensive and intensive margins of 
foreign banking, and our results have implications for various research streams. In 
international finance and macroeconomics literature, it would be interesting to explore the  
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extent to which adjustments according to the different margins may affect banks’ responses to 
macroeconomic shocks and thus the persistence of shocks. Banking literature could extend 
our study by exploring how the endogenous sorting of banks into different modes of 
internationalization, as driven by bank productivity, affects the size distribution and 
productivity of the banking industry as a whole. Such an investigation ultimately would have 
implications for the ongoing discussion about the optimal regulation of banks, especially large 
banks. We leave these issues for further research.   
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7  Technical Appendix 
7.1    Deriving the Correction Term 
Deriving the correction term, as depicted in Equation (10’), requires us to draw on the 
standard bivariate normality of error terms in equations that describe the extensive and 
intensive margins. The starting point is Equation (10), which we repeat here for convenience:  
(A.1)    b a k k EM Z u E X k EM Z IM E ijt ijt ijt IM ijt ijt ijt ijt 2 , 2 , 1 where ] , | [ ] , | [     
        
 
We next focus on the conditional expectations of the error term  ] , | [ k EM Z u E ijt ijt ijt IM   , 
that is, the last part of Equation (10). Assuming that the errors of the extensive and intensive 
margin are correlated, we can restate this term as  ] k EMijt , | [ Z v E ijt ijt IM    . We can further 
simplify the conditioning part to obtain  ] 1 ijt k ijt Z v      [ ijt k ijt IM Z v E       .  
If we assume the error term   follows a conditional standard normal distribution, we can 
explicitly write the conditional expectation as:  
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Next, rewriting the conditional expectation while applying the definition of a conditional 
density function yields a ratio of the density    ijt v   and the cumulative distribution function, 
such that we can rewrite Equation (A.2) as: 























Now, it is possible to integrate and exploit the fact that      ijt ijt ijt v v v      : 
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In turn, we obtain three distinct correction terms ( ) to address the selection bias. Their 





extensive margin level distinguish our ordered probit model from Heckman’s (1979) 
conventional selection equation. The conditional error term of the intensive margin 
] , | [ k EM Z v E ijt ijt ijt IM     transforms into: 
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which results in the correction term. In the equation for the intensive margin,    EM  becomes 
part of the coefficient to estimate, whereas the regressor   carries information on the 
different cut-offs that characterize the extensive margin. 
k
ijt 
7.2    Estimating Bank Productivity 
Our estimates of bank productivity rely on the production function approach, in the spirit 
of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Unlike the estimator proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), 
this approach can be applied to an unbalanced panel and does not require information about 
the entry and exit of banks. To illustrate the problem, consider a log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
production function for bank i in year t: 
(A.3) . ln ln ln it it it Z it K it X Z K X ln 0 it Y              
In this general exposition, we denote bank output as Y, variable input factors by X, production 
factors that are fixed in the short-run by K, and intermediate inputs required in the production 
process as Z. Of the two error components,  it  denotes unobservable productivity, and  it   is a 
random error term. Only the latter is uncorrelated with banks’ input choices. Although widely 
discussed in empirical literature on production functions, this issue has been virtually 
neglected in bank productivity studies (cf. Nakane and Weintraub 2005). Banks that 
experience a positive productivity shock expand their production, which increases their input 
demand. A negative productivity shock instead reduces their input demand. Interdependency 
in factor choices and (unobservable) productivity creates biased estimates of  it   (Levinsohn 
and Petrin 2003), which indicates productivity is a state variable that influences a bank’s input  
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decision, leading to simultaneity problems when estimating production functions. The same 
problem arises for their dual functions, that is, the cost and profit optimization problems. 
Using Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) estimation approach, we obtain unbiased estimates of 
the production functions and productivity parameters by exploiting the relationship between 
banks’ demand for intermediate inputs Z and their productivity  it  . We acknowledge that Z 
depends on both state variables: temporarily fixed factors K and unobservable productivity ω. 
Assuming that the demand for Z increases monotonously in productivity, Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) invert the demand function for the intermediate good to obtain: 
(A.4) ). , ( it it it it Z K     
Productivity thus depends on two observable inputs, such that production can be rewritten: 
(A.5) , ) ln , (ln ln ln it it it it it X it Z K X Y        
where ) ln , (ln ln 0 it it it it K it Z K K        . With certain limitations, Equation (A.5) can be 
estimated by OLS to obtain consistent estimates for the variable input parameters (Olley and 
Pakes 1996).
17 However, we cannot separate the impact of state variables on intermediate 
inputs from their impact on output and therefore require a second step to estimate the 
coefficient of the state variable K and the parameters determining productivity ( it  ). To 
identify K, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that productivity follows a first-order 
Markov process: 
(A.6) . ] | [ 1 it it it it E         
The term ξ represents productivity innovations, assumed to be independent of K. In line with 
Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008), we assume that a bank’s state variable K comprises 
fixed capital, primarily branch networks, and other tangible assets, such as IT and back-office 
equipment. In contrast, ξ may correlate with variable factors of bank production, including 
funds borrowed from depositors and other debt obligations, as well as full-time employees. 
This potential (contemporaneous) correlation of productivity innovations ξ with factor 
demand gives rise to the simultaneity problem discussed by Nakane and Weintraub (2005), 
which we must consider when estimating productivity. 
                                                 
17 Although OLS yields consistent estimates only for the variable input parameter, this provision is sufficient in 
the two-stage procedure outlined in this appendix.  
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The assumption that historical intermediate input choices are uncorrelated with 
contemporaneous innovations in productivity permits the estimation of Z. As Petrin and 
colleagues (2004) suggest, the estimation proceeds as follows: We estimate Equation (A.3) 
using OLS while replacing (.) with a third-order polynomial expansion in ln K and ln Z: 
















Thus we gain consistent estimates of X and it (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). The second 
stage of the estimation procedure identifies K (see Equation (A.5)) using the estimate of it 
obtained from: 
















For given starting values of K*, such as those obtained  from basic OLS, we can estimate 
productivity as  . This estimation yields a consistent, non-parametric 
approximation of the expectation in Equation (A.6): 
it K it it K ln ˆ ˆ
*     




2 2 1 1 0 it it it it it                 
Finally, we estimate the model with a generalized method of moments approach. We compute 
the parameters’ standard errors using bootstrapping methods, which draw on sampling from 
the panel of bank i with replacement.   
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8  Data Appendix 
We obtained all bank data from unconsolidated balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and 
audit reports reported annually by all banks to the German central bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank). The variables for both the productivity estimation and the CAMEL vector are 
corrected for outliers by truncating at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Level 
variables are deflated by the consumer price index. The country-specific variables come from 
the various sources indicated next.  
 
Bank-Level variables 
Borrowed funds: Sum of deposits and other debt liabilities in million euro. 
Capitalization: Core capital as a percentage of gross total assets. 
Cost-to-income ratio: Personnel expenditure as a percentage of total administrative cost. 
Employees: Full-time equivalents. 
Equity: Gross total equity in million euro. 
Lending: Total customer loans in million euro. 
Loan-loss provisions: Stock of loan-loss provisions as a percentage of gross total loans. 
Non-performing loans: Loans with latent risks according to central bank auditors as a 
percentage of total audited loans. 
Physical capital: Fixed assets including IT capital stock in million euro. 
Productivity: From Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), estimates of bank productivity.  
Reserves: Hidden reserves according to §340f of the German commercial code as a 
percentage of gross total assets. 
Return on equity (ROE): Operating results, including net interest, fees, commissions, and 
trading income as a percentage of equity capital. 
Total assets: Gross total assets. 
Definition of banking groups: Large banks represent the head institutions of the savings 
('Landesbanken') and cooperative bank sectors, as well as the largest commercial banks. 
Commercial banks are privately owned but not necessarily publicly listed banks. Savings 




Activity restrictions: Whether banks are restricted from engaging in securities underwriting, 
insurance underwriting and selling, real estate investments, management, and development. 
Higher values indicate more restrictions (Source: Beck et al. 2006). 
Concentration: Fraction of total assets held by the three largest banks in the economy (Source: 
World Bank).  
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Capital regulation: Combined measure of overall and initial capital stringency, ranging from 0 
to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency (Source: Beck at el. 2006). 
Developing country: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country is not a high-income country, 
according to the income taxonomy of the Worldbank (Source: WDI, Worldbank). 
Distance: Geographic distance between Germany and host country j (Source: CEPII, Paris). 
Economic freedom: Composite of 10 factors measuring institutional quality and policies 
pertaining to trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital 
flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, 
regulation, and black market activity; higher values indicate better institutions (Source: Beck 
et al. 2006). 
FDI: Aggregate volume of FDI in host country (Source: Microdatabase Foreign Direct 
Investment (MiDi), Deutsche Bundesbank). 
Financial center: Indicator variable equal to 1 for Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the UK, 
including the channel islands, following the definition of the External Position Report 
(Source: Deutsche Bundesbank). 
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product in million US dollar (2000 = 100). 
GDP–growth correlations: Correlation of German and destination country GDP in the 
preceding five years. 
Institutional quality: Six dimensions of indices: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
(Kaufman et al. 1999; Beck et al. 2006). 
Offshore destination: Indicator variable equal to 1 for Hong Kong, Singapore, and the 
Philippines, following the definition of the External Position Report (Source: Deutsche 
Bundesbank). 
Volatility: Change of growth rate residuals, net of cyclical effects in the preceding five-year 
period. 
 
External Position Report  
Data about the international assets of German banks come from the External Position report 
(Auslandsstatus) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. They are confidential and can be used on the 
premises of the Deutsche Bundesbank only. 
International assets: Loans and advances to banks, companies, governments, bonds and notes, 
foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad, denominated or converted into euro. 
Branches and subsidiaries: Foreign affiliates of German parent banks. Branches do not enjoy 
independent legal status, whereas subsidiaries do. Assets held by affiliates are attributed to the 
country in which they are located. 
List of countries: United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, India, 
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Cayman Islands, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Morocco, Malta, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,   
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Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Thailand, Turkey, 
Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, South Africa.  
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Table 1: Modes of Internationalization 





%  Number of 





Mode 0 (No foreign 
activities)  507,947 79.70  28  1.25  - 
Mode 1 
(International assets)  128,262 20.13 2,143 95.88  21 
Mode 2a (Foreign 
branches)  640 0.10  27 1.21 13 
Mode 2b (Foreign 
branches and 
subsidiaries) 
459 0.07  37 1.66  9 
Notes: Data are based on the full dataset of 2,235 banks, 58 countries, and 5 years (2002–2006). Columns 1 and 
2 reflect the full, expanded dataset using all bank–country–year combinations, Columns 3 and 4 use the dataset 
collapsed by banks; Column 5 gives the average number of countries in which banks in each mode are active. 
Mode 0 indicates that there are no activities of bank i in country j in year t.  
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Table 2: Theoretical Predictions and Measurement 
   Expected  Signs 





Mode 1?  
Bank level 
Bank productivity  i     Productivity, cost-to-income ratio, 
return on equity, size   + + + 
Bank risk aversion 
i    
High risk aversion: Capitalization, 
reserves, loan-loss provisions 
Low risk aversion: Non-
performing loans  
— — — 
Country level 
Fixed costs of foreign 
activity       j F
Activity restrictions, capital 
restrictions  — 0 — 
Expected returns   
*
L r
GDP, GDP per capita, German 
FDI  + + + 
Information costs  j    Distance, institutional quality  —  —  + 
Country risk   
*
j  GDP growth volatility  —  —  — 
Return correlations  Correlation between domestic and 
foreign GDP growth  — — —  
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Table 3: Bank Productivity Estimates 
(a) Descriptive Statistics: Bank Production Variables 
Variable     Mean  S.d.  Percentiles 
            1st  50th  99th 
Lending  Y      1,333.6      11,666.6           5.1          197.4       18,939.7 
Borrowed funds  X1      1,257.9      10,329.0           5.9          233.7       13,023.9 
Employees  X2        270.6       1,188.4           5.4            92.0        2,593.0 
Equity  Z        106.0          722.0           1.3            19.2        1,506.1 
Physical capital  K          14.9            56.1           0.1              5.1           140.6 
(b) Production Function Estimates 
   Levinsohn-Petrin  OLS 
   Coefficient  S.d.  p-value  Coefficient  S.d.  p-value 
ln Employees  0.176  0.049  0.000  0.577  0.010  0.000 
ln Borrowed funds  0.404  0.067  0.000  0.526  0.007  0.000 
ln Physical capital  0.240  0.032  0.000  -0.035  0.007  0.000 
Constant           -0.129  0.030  0.000 
   Chi²  p-value  F-test  p-value 
Ho: 1+2+3=1  17.4  0.000  345.8  0.000 
R²      0.597   
Notes: In Table 3a, the data are based on 12,569 observations for 2,439 banks between 2000 and 2006. All 
monetary volumes are in million euro. Employees are full-time equivalents. Borrowed funds are the sum of 
deposits and other debt liabilities. In Table 3b, estimates are based on 12,569 bank–year observations for the 
years 2000–2006. Time-specific fixed effects are included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors are 





Table 4: CAMEL Profile and Productivity by Internationalization Mode 
  Domestic  International assets Foreign branches Subsidiaries  All banks 
  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean S.d. 
Capitalization   5.85  3.11  5.42 2.62 4.10 3.40 3.78  4.46  5.76 3.02
Cost-income ratio  44.10  9.17  41.07 10.56 25.65 14.69 26.23  12.09  43.45 9.58
Hidden reserves  1.41  1.04  1.34 1.05 0.17 0.29 0.16  0.24  1.39 1.04
Loan-loss provisions  5.40  7.83  5.17 10.61 2.94 4.20 2.54  2.88  5.35 8.46
Non-performing loans  0.96  1.21  0.97 1.03 0.81 0.86 0.66  0.61  0.96 1.18
Productivity  11.78  25.63  19.66 33.99 115.53 60.76 112.29  61.60  13.56 28.13
Return on Equity  10.52  16.32  10.98 14.58 7.50 17.76 5.69  14.63  10.61 15.98
Notes: Descriptive statistics of parent bank-specific variables, measured in percentages except for productivity. 
Parent banks are sorted by their mode of internationalization: Mode 1 (International assets), Mode 2a (Foreign 







Table 5: Country-Specific Variables 
        Percentiles   
Variable  Unit  Mean  S.d.  1st  99th  N 
Activity restrictions  Score  8.89 2.53 4.00  14.00  174
Capital regulation  Score  5.50 1.55 2.00  8.00  174
Concentration of banking market  %  64.24 20.54 22.73  99.32  304
Developing destination  0/1 indicator  0.52 0.50 0.00  1.00  304
Distance  Kilometers  4.92 4.55 0.28  18.12  304
Financial center destination  0/1 indicator  0.05 0.22 0.00  1.00  304
Foreign direct investment (FDI)   Bn EUR  11.60 30.90 0.01  212.00  304
GDP growth correlations   %  35.44 49.63 -80.33  98.79  304
Gross domestic product (GDP)   Bn USD  597.00 1,610.00 5.25  10,900.00  304
Institutional quality  Score  3.53 0.52 2.18  4.50  174
Offshore destination  0/1 indicator  0.05 0.22 0.00  1.00  304
GDP per capita (log)  Tsd USD  16.54 16.71 0.57  71.87  304




Table 6: Baseline Estimation Results for the Extensive and Intensive Margins 
  Extensive Margin  Intensive Margin 
  Productivity Micro  Macro Regulation  Productivity Micro Macro  Regulation 
Productivity and selection                 
Correction term          3.9406***  -0.4161***  0.2836***  0.5669*** 
         (0.0548)  (0.0397)  (0.0301)  (0.0372) 
Productivity  0.0048*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0346*** 0.0128*** 0.0146*** 0.0155*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Size     0.2791***  0.4124***  0.4356***  0.1862***  0.4252***  0.5262*** 
   (0.0019)  (0.0024)  (0.0030)  (0.0107)  (0.0099)  (0.0116) 
Bank-specific  variables          
Cost-income ratio    0.0047***  0.0069***  0.0071***    -0.0598***  -0.0591*** -0.0561*** 
   (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0013) 
Return on equity    0.0015***  0.0021***  0.0016***    -0.0003  0.0011*  0.0017** 
   (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0008) 
Capitalization   -0.0129*** -0.0185***  -0.0188***    0.0279***  0.0195***  0.0212*** 
   (0.0008)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0035)  (0.0033)  (0.0038) 
Hidden  reserves   -0.0068*** -0.0131***  -0.0095***  -0.1803***  -0.2281*** -0.2346*** 
   (0.0022)  (0.0026)  (0.0032)  (0.0089)  (0.0084)  (0.0098) 
Non-performing loans    0.0053**  0.0061**  0.0035    -0.1177***  -0.1006*** -0.0805*** 
   (0.0023)  (0.0027)  (0.0033)  (0.0114)  (0.0108)  (0.0125) 
Loan-loss provisions    -0.0005*  -0.0004  -0.0002    0.0143***  0.0147***  0.0131*** 
   (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0011) 
Country-specific  variables          
Gross domestic product (GDP)      0.1833***  0.1980***      -0.4378*** -1.0102*** 
     (0.0028)  (0.0054)     (0.0112)  (0.0212) 
GDP per capita       0.3570***  0.1343***      -0.1860*** 0.6595*** 
     (0.0046)  (0.0094)     (0.0206)  (0.0438) 
German  FDI     0.1996***  0.2881***     0.7133***  0.9179*** 
     (0.0026)  (0.0042)     (0.0114)  (0.0165) 
Growth correlations       0.2469***  0.1278***      -0.0526*  -0.0247 
     (0.0066)  (0.0099)     (0.0290)  (0.0388) 
Growth volatility       -0.0074*** -0.0740***      0.1523***  0.1303*** 
     (0.0019)  (0.0026)     (0.0084)  (0.0122) 
Distance     -0.1757***  -0.3426***     0.1656***  0.3885*** 
     (0.0029)  (0.0043)     (0.0119)  (0.0172) 
Concentration       0.6128***  0.1565***     -1.6782*** -3.9171*** 
     (0.0135)  (0.0211)     (0.0502)  (0.0825) 
Activity  restrictions      -0.0876***      0.0244*** 
      (0.0019)      (0.0070) 
Capital  restrictions      -0.1109***      0.0361*** 
      (0.0021)      (0.0078) 
Institutional  quality      0.0096      -0.2245*** 
      (0.0142)      (0.0565) 
Intercepts and fixed effects          
East German banks    -0.2115*** -0.3270***  -0.3510***    0.7536***  0.6434***  0.4145*** 
   (0.0072)  (0.0087)  (0.0108)  (0.0326)  (0.0308)  (0.0357) 
Large banks    1.6847***  2.3272***  2.3492***         
   (0.0204)  (0.0232)  (0.0319)         
Commercial banks    0.2607***  0.4064***  0.3578***         
   (0.0084)  (0.0097)  (0.0125)         
Savings banks    -0.1059*** -0.1421***  -0.1628***         
   (0.0057)  (0.0068)  (0.0086)         
Euro  Area   0.8850***  -0.1416***  -0.4961***  1.9278***  1.7396***  2.2315*** 
   (0.0047)  (0.0063)  (0.0095)  (0.0305)  (0.0214)  (0.0359) 
Offshore  destination     -0.3893***  -0.1526***     -0.9356*** -0.7185*** 
     (0.0147)  (0.0192)     (0.0684)  (0.0912) 
Developing destination      -0.3778*** -0.3885***      0.1888*** -1.0713*** 
     (0.0106)  (0.0194)     (0.0501)  (0.0943) 
Financial center destination     0.8502***  0.3274***    0.3207***  1.1554*** 
     (0.0106)  (0.0159)     (0.0290)  (0.0414) 
Constant         -1.2847***  5.8681***  6.6187***  10.5808***
         (0.0788)  (0.1010)  (0.3484)  (0.5585) 
Cut-off 1  0.8998***  2.0056***  12.4399*** 8.7965***         
 (0.0019)  (0.0172)  (0.0638)  (0.1201)         
Cut-off 2  3.0711***  4.6935***  16.0496*** 12.7090***        
 (0.0103)  (0.0226)  (0.0683)  (0.1230)         
Cut-off 3  3.3637***  5.0845***  16.4922*** 13.2597***        
 (0.0149)  (0.0267)  (0.0700)  (0.1253)         
Observations and diagnostics                 
Observations  632,835 618,786 608,964 343,770 128,745 126,964 126,885 94,329 
McFadden R²  0.0133 0.1347 0.4028 0.4125 0.1015 0.2096 0.2922 0.2893 
F-tests: All equal to zero    86,490  256,636  170,327    2,246  2,096  1,372 
Micro   25,434  35,476  24,818    619.6  995.2  798.5 
Macro     114,927  63,585     1,419  938.4 
Regulation      5,299      16.27 
Banking groups    8,648  12,732  6,942          
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Notes: The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes unreported 
dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode of foreign presence. 
The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of 
international assets. Standard errors are in brackets, and time-fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Productivity is obtained by the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For further variable descriptions, 
see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.  
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Table 7: Marginal Effects 
  Extensive Margin  Intensive Margin 
   dlny/lnxm=0 dlny/lnxm=1 dlny/lnxm=2a dlny/lnxm=2b   dlny/lnx 
Productivity and selection      
Correction term      0.5669***  0.0823***
     (0.0372)  (0.0054)
Productivity 0.0005***  -0.0020*** 0.0101*** 0.0341 0.0379***  0.0155***  0.0614***
 (0.0001)  (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0731) (0.0074)  (0.0003)  (0.0013)
Size   0.4356***  -0.3911*** 1.9687*** 6.6097 7.3497***  0.5262***  0.3958***
 (0.0030)  (0.0028) (0.0150) (14.1391) (0.0692)  (0.0116)  (0.0087)
Bank-specific variables      
Cost-income ratio  0.0071***  -0.0922*** 0.4643*** 1.559 1.7335***  -0.0561***  -0.4837***
 (0.0004)  (0.0055) (0.0275) (3.3237) (0.1034)  (0.0013)  (0.0109)
Return on equity  0.0016***  -0.0051*** 0.0258*** 0.0867 0.0965***  0.0017**  0.0039**
 (0.0002)  (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.1858) (0.0133)  (0.0008)  (0.0017)
Capitalization -0.0188***  0.0324*** -0.1629*** -0.5469 -0.6081***  0.0212***  0.0240***
 (0.0012)  (0.0021) (0.0104) (1.1718) (0.0390)  (0.0038)  (0.0043)
Hidden reserves  -0.0095***  0.0039*** -0.0198*** -0.0665 -0.0740***  -0.2346***  -0.0659***
 (0.0032)  (0.0013) (0.0068) (0.1445) (0.0253)  (0.0098)  (0.0027)
Non-performing loans  0,0035  -0,001 0,0051 0.017 0,0189  -0.0805***  -0.0163***
 (0.0033)  (0.0010) (0.0048) (0.0398) (0.0179)  (0.0125)  (0.0025)
Loan-loss provisions  -0,0002  0,0004 -0,0018 -0.006 -0,0067  0.0131***  0.0142***
 (0.0003)  (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0160) (0.0103)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)
Country-specific variables      
Gross domestic product (GDP)  0.1980***  -1.5465*** 7.7850*** 26.1368 29.0633***  -1.0102***  -5.6980***
 (0.0054)  (0.0429) (0.2141) (55.4173) (0.8149)  (0.0212)  (0.1202)
GDP per capita   0.1343***  -0.3716*** 1.8706*** 6.2803 6.9835***  0.6595***  1.3861***
 (0.0094)  (0.0260) (0.1310) (13.3213) (0.4903)  (0.0438)  (0.0921)
German FDI  0.2881***  -1.2747*** 6.4166*** 21.5428 23.9548***  0.9179***  3.1511***
 (0.0042)  (0.0181) (0.0974) (46.2447) (0.3836)  (0.0165)  (0.0571)
Growth correlations   0.1278***  -0.0155*** 0.0781*** 0.2621 0.2915***  -0.0247  -0.0033
 (0.0099)  (0.0012) (0.0061) (0.5598) (0.0227)  (0.0388)  (0.0052)
Growth volatility   -0.0740***  0.0436*** -0.2194*** -0.7366 -0.8191*** 0.1303*** 0.0392***
 (0.0026)  (0.0016) (0.0077) (1.5826) (0.0292)  (0.0122)  (0.0037)
Distance -0.3426***  0.8283*** -4.1697*** -13.9991 -15.5666***  0.3885***  0.5976***
 (0.0043)  (0.0110) (0.0533) (29.9672) (0.2166)  (0.0172)  (0.0265)
Concentration   0.1565***  -0.0308*** 0.1552*** 0.5209 0.5793***  -3.9171***  -0.5304***
 (0.0211)  (0.0041) (0.0210) (1.0798) (0.0782)  (0.0825)  (0.0112)
Activity restrictions  -0.0876***  0.2323*** -1.1693*** -3.9257 -4.3652***  2.2315***  0.1565***
 (0.0019)  (0.0051) (0.0257) (8.3913) (0.0987)  (0.0359)  (0.0025)
Capital restrictions  -0.1109***  0.1815*** -0.9136*** -3.0672 -3.4106***  0.0244***  0.0400***
 (0.0021)  (0.0034) (0.0174) (6.5596) (0.0675)  (0.0070)  (0.0115)
Institutional quality  0.0096  -0.0101 0.0507 0.1703 0.1894  0.0361*** 0.0424***
 (0.0142)  (0.0150) (0.0755) (0.3968) (0.2817)  (0.0078)  (0.0092)
Intercepts and fixed effects      
East German banks  -0.3510***  0.0097*** -0.0488*** -0.164 -0.1823***  0.4145***  0.0070***
 (0.0108)  (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.3508) (0.0058)  (0.0357)  (0.0006)
Large banks  2.3492***  -0.0065*** 0.0327*** 0.1098 0.1221***   
 (0.0319)  (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.2348) (0.0020)   
Commercial banks  0.3578***  -0.0075*** 0.0376*** 0.1264 0.1405***   
 (0.0125)  (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.2705) (0.0050)   
Savings banks  -0.1628***  0.0118*** -0.0593*** -0.199 -0.2212***   
 (0.0086)  (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.4259) (0.0117)   
Euro Area  -0.4961***  0.0338*** -0.1703*** -0.5718 -0.6359***  -0.2245***  -0.1774***
 (0.0095)  (0.0007) (0.0033) (1.2261) (0.0127)  (0.0565)  (0.0447)
Offshore destination  -0.1526***  0.0026*** -0.0131*** -0.044 -0.0489***  -0.7185***  -0.0023***
 (0.0192)  (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0945) (0.0062)  (0.0912)  (0.0003)
Developing destination  -0.3885***  0.0729*** -0.3668*** -1.2316 -1.3695*** -1.0713*** -0.1998***
 (0.0194)  (0.0037) (0.0184) (2.6047) (0.0689)  (0.0943)  (0.0176)
Financial center destination  0.3274***  -0.0056*** 0.0281*** 0.0943 0.1049*** 1.1554*** 0.0445***
 (0.0159)  (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.2022) (0.0052)  (0.0414)  (0.0016)
Constant     10.5808*** 
     (0.5585) 
Cut-off 1  8.6399***     
 (0.1176)     
Cut-off 2  12.5524***     
 (0.1206)     
Cut-off 3  13.1031***     
   (0.1229)                
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Notes: The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes unreported 
dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode of foreign presence. 
The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of 
international assets. Time-fixed effects are included but not reported. Productivity is obtained using the method 
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For further variable descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant 
at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.  
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Table 8: Results per Banking Group  
  Extensive Margin  Intensive Margin 
  All  Large Com'cl  Savings  Coop's  All  Large Com'cl  Savings Coop's 
Productivity and selection         
Correction term      0.567*** 1.178***  2.478***  3.634*** 6.071***
     (0.037) (0.072)  (0.098)  (0.107) (0.103)
Productivity 0.000***  0.004***  -0.001*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.011***  -0.006***  0.101*** 0.112***
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003) (0.003)
Size   0.436***  0.390***  0.515*** 0.253*** 0.296*** 0.526*** 0.626***  1.483***  0.710*** 1.309***
 (0.003)  (0.032)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.020) (0.020)
Bank-specific variables        
Cost-income  ratio  0.007*** 0.050*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.009*** -0.056*** 0.014**  -0.034*** -0.050*** 0.021***
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.005) (0.002)
Return on equity  0.002***  -0,001  0.002*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.002** -0.014***  0  0,003 0.022***
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)
Capitalization -0.019***  0.103***  -0.010*** -0.034*** -0.023*** 0.021*** -0.128**  0,002  -0.183*** -0.060***
 (0.001)  (0.037)  (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.058)  (0.005)  (0.020) (0.010)
Hidden reserves  -0.009***  -0,243  0,005 -0.010* 0.020*** -0.235*** -0,173  0.316***  0.116*** 0,017
 (0.003)  (0.172)  (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.253)  (0.049)  (0.015) (0.015)
Non-performing loans  0,004  0,103  -0.013*** 0.055*** 0.074*** -0.081*** 0,086  -0.137***  -0,04 0.324***
 (0.003)  (0.095)  (0.004) (0.019) (0.008) (0.012) (0.145)  (0.015)  (0.053) (0.024)
Loan-loss provisions  0  0.047**  0.001*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.013*** -0.055*  0.014***  0,008 -0.073***
 (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028)  (0.001)  (0.009) (0.004)
Country-specific variables       
GDP 0.198***  -0.131***  0.153*** 0.328*** 0.139*** -1.010*** -0.308***  0,012  0,022 -1.019***
 (0.005)  (0.048)  (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.073)  (0.062)  (0.039) (0.027)
GDP per capita   0.134***  0.125*  0.135*** 0.295*** 0.045*** 0.659*** 1.477***  0.544***  2.067*** 1.162***
 (0.009)  (0.075)  (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.044) (0.115)  (0.113)  (0.074) (0.061)
German FDI  0.288***  0.402***  0.175*** 0.234*** 0.357*** 0.918*** 0.782***  0.749***  1.063*** 2.475***
 (0.004)  (0.034)  (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.028) (0.030)
Growth correlations   0.128***  0,008  -0.153*** -0.080*** 0.313*** -0,025 -0,064  -0.273**  -0.641*** 1.527***
 (0.010)  (0.086)  (0.031) (0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.127)  (0.110)  (0.060) (0.056)
Growth volatility   -0.074***  -0,002 -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.100*** 0.130*** 0,009 0.067** 0.051*** -0.180***
 (0.003)  (0.021)  (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.019) (0.019)
Distance -0.343***  -0,056  -0.300*** -0.457*** -0.298*** 0.388*** -0.355***  -0.695***  -0.573*** -0.379***
 (0.004)  (0.041)  (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.059)  (0.051)  (0.036) (0.027)
Concentration   0.157***  0,199  0,109 0.380*** 0.100*** -3.917*** -2.122***  -2.573***  -2.725*** -3.663***
 (0.021)  (0.180)  (0.068) (0.041) (0.028) (0.083) (0.276)  (0.234)  (0.137) (0.107)
Activity restrictions  -0.088***  0.046***  -0.040*** -0.112*** -0.088*** 0.024*** 0.076***  -0.078***  -0.163*** -0.317***
 (0.002)  (0.017)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.013) (0.010)
Capital restrictions  -0.111***  0,004  -0,011 -0.113*** -0.129*** 0.036*** 0.067**  0,033  -0.267*** -0.368***
 (0.002)  (0.019)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.013) (0.012)
Institutional quality  0,01  0.218*  0,066 -0.236*** 0.128*** -0.224*** -0.906*** -0.758***  -0.790*** 0.544***
 (0.014)  (0.114)  (0.043) (0.026) (0.019) (0.057) (0.174)  (0.156)  (0.092) (0.072)
Intercepts and fixed effects      
East German banks  -0.351***  -0.395***  -0.163*** -0,005 -0.245*** 0.414*** -1.701***  0.601***  0.871*** -0.226***
 (0.011)  (0.098)  (0.050) (0.024) (0.017) (0.036) (0.147)  (0.169)  (0.067) (0.052)
Euro Area  -0.496***  -0.188*  -0,027 -0.420*** -0.621*** 2.231*** 0.624***  0.640***  1.574*** 0.345***
 (0.009)  (0.098)  (0.032) (0.019) (0.012) (0.036) (0.136)  (0.105)  (0.059) (0.058)
Offshore destination  -0.153***  0.576***  0.149*** 0.072** -0.412*** -0.718*** 0.883***  -0,025  0.253* -3.298***
 (0.019)  (0.143)  (0.055) (0.034) (0.029) (0.091) (0.219)  (0.216)  (0.141) (0.140)
Developing country  -0.389***  0,137  -0.222*** -0.734*** -0.254*** -1.071*** -0,254 -0,194  -4.291*** -2.575***
 (0.019)  (0.155)  (0.059) (0.036) (0.027) (0.094) (0.235)  (0.243)  (0.159) (0.131)
Financial center   0.327***  0.703***  0.257*** 0.234*** 0.379*** 1.155*** 1.505***  1.428***  1.747*** 0.577***
 (0.016)  (0.149)  (0.053) (0.036) (0.020) (0.041) (0.221)  (0.145)  (0.070) (0.049)
Constant       10.581*** -3.113**  -7.036***  -23.471*** -23.504***
        (0.559) (1.549)  (1.485)  (1.120) (0.988)
Cut-off 1  8.640***  5.351***  7.288*** 9.619*** 8.223***    
 (0.118)  (1.032)  (0.377) (0.231) (0.157)    
Cut-off 2  12.552***  9.313***  10.337*** 14.642*** 12.945***    
 (0.121)  (1.047)  (0.381) (0.253) (0.174)    
Cut-off 3  13.103***  10.247***  10.867*** 14.812***    
 (0.123)  (1.048)  (0.383) (0.262)    
Observations 343,770  3,185  24,080 83,300 233,205 94,329 2,839  9,131  28,874 53,471
R²  0.412 0.375 0.326 0.407 0.43 0.29 0.656 0.315  0.251 0.356
Notes: Large banks represent the largest commercial banks, Landesbanken, and central cooperatives. Commercial 
banks are privately owned banks; savings and cooperative banks are regionally operating small banks, owned 
either mutually or by (regional) governments. The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an 
ordered probit model and includes unreported dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The 
dependent variable is the mode of foreign presence. The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with 
OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of international assets. Time-fixed effects are included but not 
reported. The sample spans the period 2002 to 2006. Productivity is obtained with the method proposed by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For further variable descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. 




Figure 1: Volumes of Investment 














































Notes: Total volume is in million € and indicates the total international assets of all banks in a specific Mode, 
aggregated across countries. Mode 1 (International assets), Mode 2a (Foreign branches), and Mode 2b (Branches 
and subsidiaries), aggregated across countries. Mean volume is in million € and gives the mean international assets 
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